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JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is conferred Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2-2(3)(j).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Defendant/appellee Brigham City submits that the issues
presented for review are as follows:
1.

Whether the trial court correctly determined that the

Brigham City Council's exercise of legislative discretion in
setting electrical utility rates which generate revenues in
excess of the cost of providing electrical utility services is
valid and not so unreasonable as to be arbitrary or capricious or
in violation of the legislative guidelines in Utah Code Ann.
§ 55-3-10.
2.

Whether the trial court correctly ruled, based upon the

undisputed facts, that Brigham City's utility service charges, in
the form of rates for electrical power, are reasonable for the
service provided as a matter of law.
3.

Whether the trial court correctly concluded that a

challenge to the validity of Brigham City's electrical utility
rates by an individual resident who is a utility customer does
not give rise to a claim of constitutional dimensions or
otherwise establish the deprivation of a protected property
interest in contravention of Art. I, § 22 of the Utah
Constitution.
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STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
In reviewing an order granting summary judgment, this court
views the facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party and gives no deference to the trial court/s
conclusions of law, reviewing them for correctness.

Little

America Hotel v. Salt lake City, 785 P.2d 1106, 1107 (Utah 1989);
Sacramento Baseball Club, Inc. v. The Great N. Baseball Co., 786
P.2d 763, 767 (Utah 1987).

This standard should be applied in

reviewing all the above issues.
To the extent plaintiff/appellant Walker ("Walker") is
arguing that his Motion For Summary Judgment was improperly
denied, defendant/appellee Brigham City disagrees with his
assertion that the facts relating to that motion must be
"considered in a light most favorable to [Walker]."
Appellant's Brief, p. 1.

See

Walker cannot have it both ways.

He is

the non-moving party only with respect to Brigham City's Motions
For Partial Summary Judgment.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES. ORDINANCES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 55-3-10:
Rates for service to be reasonable and uniform —
revised.

May be

Rates for services furnished by any project or
service as described in Section 55-3-1 hereof shall be
reasonable and uniform in respect to class at all
times. They may be fixed precedent to the issuance of
the bonds. Such rates shall be sufficient to provide
for the payment of the interest upon and principal of
all such bonds as and when the same become due and
payable, to create a bond and interest sinking fund
therefor, to provide for the payment of the expenses of
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administration and operation and such expenses for the
maintenance of the project or service, necessary to
preserve the same in good repair and working order, to
build up a reserve for depreciation, to build up a
reserve for improvements, betterments and extensions
other than those necessary to maintain the same in good
repair and working order, and to pay the interest on
and principal of any other bonds or obligations
outstanding and issued in connection with the purchase,
construction, repair or improvement of the project or
service. Such rates may be fixed and revised from time
to time so as to produce these amounts, and the
governing body may covenant and agree in the ordinance
or other legislative enactment authorizing the issuance
of such bonds and on the fact of each bond at all times
to maintain such rates for services furnished by the
project or service as shall be sufficient to provide
for the foregoing, but not in excess of a reasonable
rate for the service rendered.
Utah Constitution Art. I, Section 22.:
[Private property for public use.]
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for
public use without just compensation.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Brigham City owns and operates various utilities providing
services including water, waste treatment, refuse collection and
electrical power to Brigham City residents and businesses.

The

City maintains a single utility fund combining these various
services, but every individual consumer receives a bill itemizing
the charges for each separate service, including electrical
power, and the City separately accounts for the revenue derived
from the different service charges.
Electrical utility service charges have historically
generated revenues which exceed the expenditures necessary for
the operation of the utility service.
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A portion of these

revenues has been transferred to the City's general fund
following the publication of notice concerning the anticipated
transfer in the utility billings sent to customers in compliance
with state statutory requirements.
Plaintiff/appellant Leo Walker (hereinafter "Walker"), sued
Brigham City asserting various claims relating to the process for
setting the rates charged for electrical services, the City
Council's management of utility funds and the general fund as
well as various complaints about the City's financial
relationship with its Redevelopment Agency. See Complaint, Record
at 1 - 52.

Claims 1 through 6 of plaintiff's Complaint were

dismissed, pursuant to a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, by
Order dated May 31, 1989.

See Order, Record at 582-84. (A copy

is included in the Addendum hereto.)

Claims 13, 14 and 15 had

been previously dismissed by an Order dated November 4, 1987. See
Record at 196-97.
On August 23, 1989, the Court granted a stipulated motion to
bifurcate the Complaint.

See Record at 600-01.

Accordingly,

claims 7 through 12 were bifurcated from the remaining claims,
which involved the Brigham City Redevelopment Agency and various
financial transactions in which it was engaged.

It was agreed

that the parties would proceed on Claims 7 through 12 and
litigation on the remaining claims would be stayed.1
1

That determination was made prior to the decision and
discussion of this court regarding Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure in Kennecott Corp. v Utah State Tax
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Claims 7 through 12 challenged the validity of Brigham
City's procedure for setting charges for electrical power and its
practice of transferring funds from the electrical fund to the
general fund.

The basis of Walker's challenge was that the

revenues received by Brigham City for electrical utility services
are greater than the costs of providing such service and are
therefore "unreasonable.11
Brigham City moved for summary judgment on the grounds that,
as a matter of law:

1) the electrical service charges are

reasonable for the service provided when compared with the rates
charged to similarly situated customers of Utah Power & Light and
other municipally-owned power systems in the State of Utah;
2) the process involved in setting rates and transferring funds
from the utility fund to the general fund is pursuant to notice
and discussion by the City Council in open and public meetings
and is therefore fair and reasonable; and, 3)

Walker's misplaced

reliance on a rate of return analysis is not the proper measure
of the reasonableness of electrical service charges and
improperly requires the court to engage in rate setting which
ignores the presumptive validity afforded such local governmental
Commission. 814 P.2d 1099 (Utah 1991). However, Walker's claims
against the Redevelopment Agency of Brigham City and related
parties are entirely separate and distinct and there is no
"factual overlap" between the operative facts relating to those
legal theories and the claims which are the subject of this
appeal. See Complaint, Record at 1-52. In addition, a decision
on the claims which are stayed and remain pending at the trial
court level would not render moot or otherwise effect the issues
in this appeal.
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decisions and the limited scope of judicial review of such
decisions.

On March 27, 1991, the trial court entered its

Memorandum Decision granting Brigham City's Motion For Summary
Judgment. Record at (this document is not stamped, but it is
between pp. 743 and 744 of the Record and included in the
Addendum hereto).

The Court's Order And Judgment was entered on

April 22, 1991. Record at (this document is not stamped, but it
is between pp. 752 and 753 of the Record and attached in the
Addendum hereto).2
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Brigham City disputes the accuracy and materiality of many
of the facts set forth in the "FACTS" statement of Walker's Brief
on appeal.3 Walker, furthermore, now attempts to present to this
2

The trial court's Order and Judgment of April 22, 1991,
made an express determination that it was a final judgment for
purposes of appeal as required by Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure. See the discussion in Footnote 1 confirming
that there is no factual overlap between the operative facts
relating to the plaintiff's claims that are the subject of this
appeal and the claims which were stayed and remain pending at the
trial court level relating to the Brigham City Redevelopment
Agency.
In addition, the trial court had previously dismissed
all claims against the individual defendants which are the
subject of this appeal by order dated May 31, 1989 which was
specifically incorporated into the April 22, 1991 Order and
Judgment. (See Addendum). To the extent that Walker's appeal is
directed toward any of these individual defendants, the arguments
presented on behalf of Brigham City apply with equal force and
effect to such individual defendants.
3

One example of the inaccurate and misleading nature of
Walker's "facts" is found in the commentary of f 12 on page xi of
Walker's Brief where he states that a comparison of the numbers
he sets forth in ffl 10 and 11 indicate that the electric utility
charges to rate-payers were "almost double that which was
necessary" to cover expenses.

- 6 -

court "facts" that were never actually presented to the trial
court in connection with his opposition to Defendants' Motion For
Summary Judgment. See Record at 669-70.
The following is an accurate statement of the undisputed
material facts actually presented to the trial court in
conjunction with Brigham City's Motion For Summary Judgment.
None of the following facts were disputed by Walker with citation
to supporting affidavits, deposition testimony or otherwise as
provided in Rule 56, Utah R. Civ. P. See Record at 669-70.
1.

Brigham City is a municipal corporation which owns and

operates an electrical utility.
2.

The City Council of Brigham City is the governing body

of the City.
3.

(Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-105.)

Utility rates are set by the City Council of Brigham

City pursuant to resolution of the City Council.

(Complaint,

1 19, Rec. at 1.)
4.

Brigham City utility customers are given notice of the

annual City budget hearing where they may contest matters
As Walker has acknowledged, Brigham City owns and operates
several utility services, including water, sewage, and
electricity, and charges for those services are collected in a
consolidated fund. Id. at f 3. The surplus amounts set forth in
f 10 of Walker7s Brief are surpluses in the consolidated utility
fund. They are not, as Walker would now have this Court believe,
attributable only to electricity charges. In contrast, the
numbers set forth in fl 11 of Walker's Brief pertain only to
electricity expenses. Consequently, Walker is comparing apples
and oranges. The "simple comparison of paragraphs 10 and 11"
Walker suggests is not possible and does not indicate that ratepayers were charged "almost double that necessary to provide the
services..."
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relating to electrical utility service charges.

(Affidavit of

Dennis Sheffield, Rec. at 652 - 54.)
5.

Plaintiff is a resident of Brigham City, Utah and is

regularly charged and has paid charges to Brigham City for
utility services provided by the City.

(Complaint, f 1, Rec. at

1.)
6.

Funds paid by utility customers are collected in the

City's consolidated utility fund.

(Affidavit of Dennis

Sheffield, Rec. at 653.)
7.

A portion of the funds collected in the City's

consolidated utility fund is transferred to the City's general
fund.

(Complaint, f 23, Rec. at 1.)
8.

Brigham City utility users are given notice in advance

of transfers from the utility fund, specifically the electrical
fund, to the City's general fund.

(Affidavit of Dennis

Sheffield, Rec. at 653.)
9.

The rate charged to Brigham City utility customers for

electricity is lower than the rate charged to the average
customer of Utah Power & Light.

(Mark Stevens Deposition, p. 32;

Rec. at 658.)
10.

The rate paid by Brigham City utility customers for

electrical services is lower than the average monthly bill paid
by utility customers in municipalities which own and operate
their own power systems.

(Id.)
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11.

The rates charged to utility customers in Brigham City

are lower than the average rates charged by municipalities whose
property tax bases most nearly approximate Brigham City and which
operate their own electrical utilities.

(Id. at 660-661.)

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DECISION OF THE BRIGHAM CITY COUNCIL TO
SET ELECTRICAL UTILITY RATES AT LEVELS THAT
GENERATE REVENUES IN EXCESS OF THE COST OF
PROVIDING ELECTRICAL UTILITY SERVICE IS A
VALID EXERCISE OF LEGISLATIVE DISCRETION BY
THE CITY COUNCIL AND SHOULD NOT BE DISTURBED
BY THIS COURT UNLESS FOUND TO BE SO
UNREASONABLE AS TO BE ARBITRARY AND
CAPRICIOUS.
In essence, Walker is asking the judicial branch of
government to intervene in the legislative and discretionary
functions of the Brigham City Council and hold that Brigham
City's legitimate decision-making process in setting electrical
utility rates is invalid.

This court, however, should not

involve itself in the rate setting process, McOuillin, Municipal
Corporations, § 35.37a, 3rd ed. 1983. While a limited form of
judicial review may be appropriate as to whether the rate setting
procedure is so unreasonable as to be considered arbitrary and
capricious, courts may not engage in rate making since that would
represent an unwarranted intrusion into a legislative function,
McQuillin, Municipal Corporations. § 35.37a, 3rd ed. 1983.
Utah courts have historically given considerable deference
to the actions of the governing body of municipalities for the
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same or substantially similar public policy considerations.

As

this Court stated the proposition in Clayton v. Salt Lake City,
387 P.2d 93, 94 (Utah 1963):
Inherent in the nature of its duties and its
presumed superior knowledge and expertise in
performing them, the public authority must have a
wide latitude in which to exercise its judgment as
to the best means of accomplishing that objective.
The court is reluctant to interfere with the
administrative function and would do so only if
facts were shown to indicate dishonesty, fraud,
collusion or lack of good faith in performing the
duty mentioned. That is not demonstrated here.
The same general policy was more recently iterated in
Triangle Oil, Inc. v. North Salt Lake Corp., 609 P.2d. 1338 (Utah
1980) :
It has been found to be wise and proper judicial
policy to exercise its [the judiciary7s] power with
restraint, and not intrude into or interfere with the
discretionary functions or policies of other
departments of government. Accordingly, the courts
generally will not so interfere with actions of a city
council unless its action is outside of its authority
or is so wholly discordant to reason and justice that
its action must be deemed capricious and arbitrary and
thus in violation of the complainants rights.
609 P.2d at 1340 (emphasis added).
Courts in other states which have specifically addressed
municipal utility rates have recognized a presumption of validity
in rates set by municipal ordinance.

Plaintiffs challenging such

rates bear a heavy burden in showing they are unreasonable.
Inland Real Estate Corp. v. Village of Pallatine, 496 N.E.2d at
1002 (111. 1986).

- 10 -

In the instant case, Walker neither asserted nor provided
any evidence to the trial court that Brigham City's utility rates
resulted from dishonesty, fraud, or collusion.

Likewise, Walker

neither claimed nor provided any evidence at all that the rates
were "wholly discordant with reason."

With the required

deference to the local government functions, the presumption of
reasonableness clearly favors the position of Brigham City in
this case.

See Id.

Because Walker completely failed to provide any evidence of
unreasonableness to the trial court, this presumption itself
would have been sufficient to support a summary judgment in
Brigham City's favor.

Nonetheless, Brigham City provided the

trial court with further evidence of the reasonableness of its
rates in the form of deposition testimony and affidavits. (Rec.
at 652-664.)
Brigham City's Memorandum in support of its Motion For
Partial Summary Judgment presented evidence in the form of
deposition testimony from Mark Stevens, a CPA, regarding charges
for utility services.

Stevens's testimony established that rates

charged by Brigham City are lower than rates charged for similar
service by Utah Power & Light Company and other municipally owned
and operated utilities of similar size to Brigham City. Record at
658 -661.
Walker provided the trial court with no evidence at all to
refute Brigham City's evidence of the reasonableness of its
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utility rates.

Walker merely attempted, as he does again on

appeal, to equate "unreasonableness" with any revenue exceeding
operating costs.

In his Brief, the only supporting evidence

Walker cites is the deposition testimony of an accountant to the
effect that Brigham City's utility revenues have exceeded costs
and that Mr. Walker's payments are "in excess of a pro rata rate
for the cost to Brigham City of services rendered to Mr. Walker."
Walker Brief, pp. 18-19.

As discussed above, whether revenues

exceed costs is essentially irrelevant.

The only issue properly

presented to the trial court on summary judgment was the
reasonableness of the rates.
"In evaluating whether the evidence reveals a genuine issue
of material fact ..., [the court] must take into consideration
the eventual standard of proof, at trial on the merits, of each
element of ... [the] claim."

Weber v. Sprinqville City, 725 P.2d

1360 (Utah 1986); Robinson v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc.,
740 P.2d 262 (Utah App. 1987).

Brigham City presented evidence

of the reasonableness of the utility rates and that evidence was
never controverted with competent evidence by Walker.
The undisputed evidence before the trial court was that
Brigham City's utility rates are reasonable compared to the rates
charged by other comparable utilities, both regulated and
unregulated.

Based on that conclusion, the trial court properly

deferred to the exercise of legislative discretion by the Brigham
City Council and refrained from involving itself in the rate
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setting process for all of the public policy reasons more fully
discussed above. Where no material issues of fact regarding the
reasonableness of Brigham City's utility rates were presented to
the trial court, summary judgment for defendants was mandatory.
POINT II
BRIGHAM CITY'S RATES FOR ELECTRICAL UTILITY SERVICE
CHARGES ARE REASONABLE FOR THE SERVICE PROVIDED AS A
MATTER OF LAW.
A municipality which owns and operates a public utility is
exercising its business powers and may conduct the activity in a
manner which promises the greatest benefit to the City.

The

process of setting rates for utility services by a municipality
is a legislative act and authority for the act is vested in the
governing body of the municipality.

McQuillin, Municipal

Corporations, § 35.37, 3rd ed. 1983. Unless the municipality's
exercise of discretion is in bad faith or ultra vires, courts
should not interfere with the reasonable legislative decision
making process of the City Council. McQuillin, Municipal
Corporations, § 35.27, 3rd ed. 1983; Triangle Oil, Inc. v. North
Salt Lake Corp.. 609 P.2d 1338, 1340 (Utah 1980); Enterprise.
Inc. v. Nampa City. 536 P.2d 729 (Idaho 1975).
A. Brigham City is authorized to charge reasonable rates.
Brigham City's authority to own and operate its utility
works is established by Utah Code Ann. § 55-3-1 et seq.
Section 55-3-10 addresses the topic of the rates Brigham City may
charge for these services:
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Rates for service to be reasonable and uniform - May be
revised.
Rates for services furnished by any project or service
as described in Section 55-3-1 hereof shall be
reasonable and uniform in respect to class at all
times. They may be fixed precedent to the issuance of
the bonds. Such rates shall be sufficient to provide
for the payment of the interest upon and principal of
all such bonds as and when the same become due and
payable, to create a bond and interest sinking fund
therefor, to provide for the payment of the expenses of
administration and operation and such expenses for the
maintenance of the project or service, necessary to
preserve the same in good repair and working order, to
build up a reserve for depreciation, to build up a
reserve for improvements, betterments and extensions
other than those necessary to maintain the same in good
repair and working order, and to pay the interest on
and principal of any other bonds or obligations
outstanding and issued in connection with the purchase,
construction, repair or improvement of the project or
service. Such rates may be fixed and revised from time
to time so as to produce these amounts, and the
governing body may covenant and agree in the ordinance
or other legislative enactment authorizing the issuance
of such bonds and on the face of each bond at all times
to maintain such rates for services furnished by the
project or service as shall be sufficient to provide
for the foregoing, but not in excess of a reasonable
rate for the services rendered.
This provision clearly provides that the service rates "shall be
sufficient" to cover the costs and expenses specifically
enumerated.

The only limit § 55-3-10 places on rates is they not

exceed a "reasonable rate for the service rendered."
In his Brief, Walker argues, without authority, that § 55-310 provides that the charges may not exceed amounts sufficient to
cover the enumerated expenses.

Walker Brief, pp. 2-4.

Clearly,

if this had been the legislature's intent, it would have included
language to that effect and all references to "reasonable rate
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for the service" would have been eliminated.

The very title of

the provision makes this abundantly clear: "Rates for service to
be reasonable and uniform - may be revised."
There appears to be no case law in this state directly
interpreting the "reasonableness" provisions of Utah Code Ann.
§ 55-3-10, which is not surprising given the relatively clear
language of the statute.

It is, however, well recognized in

other jurisdictions that in setting utility rates, municipalities
are not restricted to charging rates based solely on the costs of
providing such services.
For example, in Hansen v. City of San Buenaventura, 729 P.2d
186, 192 (Cal. 1986), the California Supreme Court found that an
entity of local government could charge and collect fees for
services, such as a municipal utility system, and use the net
proceeds of such enterprises "for the benefit of its own general
fund."

The California Court further noted that "parks,

playgrounds, public utilities, and other facilities in aid of the
health and welfare of the community . . . may be operated for
profit."

[Emphasis in original].

Finally, the California Court

held that "it is for the local governing body to determine
precise rates and whether the system should be subsidized or
profitable."
Similarly, in Chocolay Charter Township v. City of
Marquette, 358 N.W.2d 636, 638 (Mich. 1984) the Michigan Court of
Appeals recognized, "A municipality is not required to furnish
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utility services at cost, but may charge a rate which will yield
a profit."

See also. Inland real Estate Corp. v. Village of

Pallatine, 496 N.E.2d 998, 1002 (111. 1986); Killian v. City of
Paris, 241 S.W.2d 524, 527 (Tenn. 1951); and City of Corning v.
Iowa/Nebraska Light & Power Co., 282 N.W. 791, 799 (Iowa 1938).
McQuillin, a recognized authority in the area of municipal law,
agrees with this position:

f,

A city is entitled to a reasonable

profit and may even use that profit for other valid municipal
purposes."

McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, § 35.37c, 3rd ed.

1988.
B.

Fees for electrical utility services may permissibly
generate revenues which exceed the cost of providing
such services.

Under Point III of his Brief, Walker makes the convoluted
argument that utility charges are not taxes, but rather fees, and
because municipalities may raise revenues only through taxes,
Brigham City is not permitted to raise revenues through utility
charges.

Walker's simplistic argument fails to recognize that

there are essentially two distinct types of fees.

These are:

1) licensing or permit fees for regulatory processes, and
fees for specific services.

2)

He mistakenly bases his argument

completely on cases discussing licensing fees and regulatory
measures.

None of these cases supports his position.

Walker first cites Mountain States Telephone v. Salt Lake
County, 702 P.2d 113 (Utah 1985), where the only issue considered
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by the court was whether the county could levy a utility license
tax as a condition to the granting of a franchise for the use of
public rights of way.

As Walker notes in his Brief, the court

quoted City of Chicago Heights v. Public Service Co., 97 N.E.2d
807 (111. 1951), in which an Illinois court "struck down an
ordinance which imposed license fees greatly in excess of the
reasonable cost of regulating the use of city streets."
States, 702 P.2d at 118.

Mountain

Thus the court focused on the

reasonable relationship between licensing revenues and the cost
of regulation. Id.
Another case relied upon by Walker is Consolidated Coal Co.
v. Emery County, 702 P.2d 121 (Utah 1985).

Consolidated Coal

concerns the validity of an Emery County business license
ordinance.

The court expressly held that Utah counties are not

permitted "to raise revenues through licensing except insofar as
such revenue is necessary to (and therefore proportionate to the
cost of) regulation of the licensed entities."

The court found

that the ordinance in question was invalid because it had
"little, if any, regulatory purpose or effect." 702 P.2d at 127.
Thus, as in Mountain States, the court discussed only the
reasonable relation between licensing revenues and the cost of
regulation.
Walker also cites Lafferty v. Pavson City, 642 P.2d 376
(Utah 1982), Banberry Development Corp. v. South Jordan City, 631
P.2d 899 (Utah 1981), and Call v. City of West Jordan, 614 p.2d
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1257 (Utah 1980).

All three of these cases involve ordinances

requiring impact or connection fees from a builder as a
prerequisite to final approval of the builder's plat or building
permit.

Again, the ordinances in question were regulatory

measures.
Brigham City recognizes that these cases cited by Walker
support the proposition that local governmental regulatory fees
are required under state law to be reasonably related to the
costs of regulation.

This case, however, involves only fees for

specific services - the same services which, in some communities,
are provided by investor-owned utility companies.

Brigham City's

charges are not imposed as a prerequisite of any city
certification or regulatory action or as payment for future
services or costs.

They are rather contractual service charges

for services which plaintiff voluntarily used.

As discussed

above, the only restriction is that the fees be at a "reasonable
rate for the services rendered."

Utah Code Ann. § 55-3-10.

Walker has not cited a single case which states that fees
for specific, nonregulatory, services cannot exceed the cost of
providing those services.

The courts should not intrude into

this decision making process unless there is a showing, by
competent evidence, that the rates charged are without any
rational basis or are otherwise so unreasonable as to be
completely arbitrary and capricious.
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The undisputed evidence on the limited question of
"reasonableness" in this case demonstrates that Brigham City's
rates are not unreasonable, as more fully set forth under
Point I, supra. and the trial Court properly declined to
substitute its judgment for that of the Brigham City Council.
Accordingly, Walker's challenge to the wisdom of this exercise of
the legislative body's discretion was properly dismissed as a
matter of law.
POINT III
THE PLAINTIFF HAS NO PROTECTED PROPERTY
INTEREST OR CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS TO CHALLENGE
THE RATES CHARGED FOR UTILITY SERVICES BY
BRIGHAM CITY.
Walker alleges, in conclusory fashion, that the electrical
utility rates charged by Brigham City somehow violate the takings
clause of the Utah Constitution.

He fails, however, to identify

any protected or recognized property interest sufficient to
invoke the protection of either constitutional provision.
Article I# § 22 of the Utah Constitution provides, "Private
property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without
just compensation."

Before being entitled to recover under this

provision, Walker must identify "some protectible property
interest."

Colman v. Utah State Land Bd.. 795 P.2d 622, 625

(Utah 1990).
It is difficult to ascertain the nature of the protected
interest Walker is claiming in this case. While continued
utility service has been recognized as a protected property
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interest, which may not be terminated except for cause and after
reasonable notice, Walker has failed to show that any such
protected property interest is involved in this case.

Walker can

only recover for the taking of property to the extent that
property exists and to the extent that he has legal rights in
that property.

Id. at 626.

As Walker has acknowledged (Walker Brief, p. 4), the Utah
Supreme Court has taken the position of the majority of states
that charges imposed by municipalities upon their residents for
utility services are not considered taxes or assessments, but
rather charges for services.

Ponderosa One Ltd. Partnership v.

Salt Lake City Suburban Sanitary Dist., 738 P.2d 635, 637 (Utah
1987)(citing Home Builders Ass'n of Greater Salt Lake v. Provo
City, 503 P.2d 451 (Utah 1972) and Murray City v. Bd. of
Education. 396 P.2d 628 (Utah 1964)).
Walker has chosen to avail himself of the utility services
provided by the City.

With respect to these services, his

relationship with the City is contractual.

There is no element

of deprivation in this case, only one of contract.

Walker has

received the benefits of utility services from the city and the
cost of those services was properly determined by elected City
officials.

Under these circumstances there can be no deprivation

of property within the meaning of the Utah Constitution, Art. I,
§ 22.

Cf. Carson v. Brockton Sewerage Comm'n, 182 U.S. 398

(1901) .
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In his Brief, Walker takes language out of context from
various cases and, without explanation, alleges that the same
language applies to this case.

It does not.

Of the six cases Walker cites in support of his "takings"
claim, four again involve fees for permits - not services.4
Walker Brief, pp. 13-15 (citing Call v. City of West Jordan , 614
P.2d 1257 (Utah 1980); Home Builders Ass'n of Greater Kansas City
v. Kansas City, 555 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Mo. 1977); Weber Basin Home
Builders Ass'n v. Rov City, 487 P.2d 866 (Utah 1971); City of
Chicago Heights v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 94 N.E.2d 306
(111. 1950)).

Call concerned a developer's challenge to a city

ordinance requiring subdividers to dedicate 7% of proposed
subdivision land to the city or pay that value in cash to be used
for flood control and/or park and recreation facilities. 614 P.2d
1257.

The Court simply held that, to prevail on their takings

claim, plaintiffs would have to "show that the dedication
required of them had no reasonable relationship to the needs ...
created by their subdivision." Id. at 1259.

The court went on to

say that the benefit for which the dedication would pay need not
be solely to the particular subdivision, but only that there be
some demonstrable benefit to it. Id.
Even if Brigham City's charges for utility service were
analogous to the dedication requirement on subdividers addressed

4

See discussion regarding distinction between fees for
services and fees for permits, supra pp. 16-18.
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in Call, there is no question that Walker has received some
demonstrable benefit.

It is undisputed that Walker received

utility service from Brigham City.
Weber Basin concerned an action brought by an association of
builders challenging an ordinance increasing building permit
fees.

The question considered by the Court was:

whether the ordinance, in its practical operation,
results in an unjust discrimination by imposing a
greater burden of the cost of city government on one
class of persons as compared to another, without any
proper basis for such differentiation and
classification.
487 P.2d at 868.

The question of a taking under Art. I, § 22 of

the Utah Constitution was not even addressed.
has no bearing on the instant case.

Weber Basin, thus,

Even if Walker were

complaining of unjust discrimination, there is no evidence that
Walker,s utility bills are any different from those of any other
similarly situated resident of Brigham City.
The remaining two cases are also easily legally and
factually distinguished from the instant case.

In Conoco, Inc.

v. Louisiana Public Service Comm'n, 520 So.2d 404 (La. 1988), the
Louisiana Supreme Court considered only whether a contract
between Conoco and Enterprise Pipeline was impaired by a tariff
imposed by the Public service Commission and whether an
impairment would violate the proscription against impairment of
contracts in the Louisiana Constitution.

The case did not

involve recognition of Walker's proposition that there is some
sort of protected property or constitutional interest in low
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utility rates.

In

State of North Carolina, ex rel Utilities

Comm'n v. Edminsten, 263 S.E.2d 583 (N.C. 1980) the North
Carolina Court discussed the public service commission's
responsibility to set rates for utilities as low as permissible
without violating the utility company's constitutional rights to
a fair return.

None of these cases recognizes that a consumer

has a constitutionally protectible property interest in rates
paid for utility services, particularly where the service is
owned and operated by a municipality, like Brigham City.
There are very limited circumstances in which courts may
consider claims of this nature, such as the termination of
electrical utility services without notice and hearing.
Otherwise, they traditionally involve claims of confiscatory
taking from the utility because rates for investor-owned
utilities are arbitrarily set at such a low level as to destroy a
protected property interest by not allowing a reasonable rate of
return.
An example of such a case which addresses utility rates in
the context of a claim for unconstitutional taking is Duquesne
Light Company v. Barasch, 109 S. Ct. 609 (1989).

In Duquesne,

the court found that the federal constitution protects utilities
from being limited to a charge for their property which is so low
and therefore so "unjust" as to be confiscatory.

"A rate is too

low if it is 'so unjust' as to destroy the value of [the
property] for all the purposes for which it was acquired, and in
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so doing practically deprive[s] the owner of property without due
process of law."

Obviously, Duquesne gives no support to

Walker's argument.
Walker's claim against Brigham City is that the City's
charges for utility services are too high.

This claim is simply

not of constitutional magnitude.
CONCLUSION
Walker fails to set forth any claim or theory which would
justify a further review by this Court of the legitimate exercise
of legislative discretion by the Brigham City Council and the
wisdom and judgment involved in their decisions regarding rates
charged for electrical utility services and the transfer of any
surpluses to the general fund.

The process used by Brigham City

to fix rates by resolution of the City Council and its practice
of conducting public budget hearings, sending notice of transfers
from the electrical fund to the general fund and the normal
elective process for the City Council provide the plaintiff with
abundant due process and fairness.

In fact, this subject was

specifically raised as a campaign issue in recent Brigham City
municipal elections.
In effect, any analogy to the role of the Public Service
Commission in regulating rates of investor-owned utilities is not
applicable because the "rate payers" and "owners" are essentially
the same group, consisting of the residents, property owners and
voters of Brigham City.
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This is not the appropriate forum in which to question the
wisdom of the exercise of legislative discretion on the part of
the Brigham City Council.

Walkers "remedy," if he has one, is

through persuasion of his elected representatives in public
hearings and meetings in which rates are established for
electrical utility services and transfers of any surpluses to the
general fund are approved or a resort to the ballot box in future
elections of Brigham City officials.

As one court noted in a

similar context in Silver v. City of Los Angeles, 366 P.2d 651,

653 (Ca. 1962):^S5'^^0

A

K^C

-J \X
Under such circumstances, they are answerable to the
electorate, but not the courts, if they were mistaken
or wanting in business acumen.
For all the reasons set forth above, Walker's Appeal should
be dismissed and the Summary Judgment of the trial court
affirmed.
DATED t h i s t _ 2 . day of O c t o b e r ,

1992.

WII/£JAMS & HUNT
flUNT
By

7\ DuAHJZfih"
_
Jody/K Eunrnett
KurttjM. Frankenburg
Attorneys for defendants/Appellees
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CRAIG L. BARLOW (A0213)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendants Brigham
City Corporation and Co-Counsel
for Brigham City Redevelopment
Agency
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000

IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
LEO A. WALKER,
Plaintiff,
ORDER AND JUDGMENT

vs.
BRIGHAM CITY, PETER C.
KNUDSON, BETH W. CURRISTER,
DAVID G. HACKING, DEE J.
HAMMON, ROBERT B. SHELTON and
MARK A. WALKER, REDEVELOPMENT
AGENCY NO. 1 OF BRIGHAM CITY,
REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY NO. 2 OF
BRIGHAM CITY, MICHAEL T.
COSGROVE, and JOHN OR JANE
DOES I THROUGH X,

Civil No. 870030069

Defendants.

Defendants filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.

Both

parties submitted memoranda and the Court heard oral argument on
February

25,

1991.

The

Court

has

considered

the

memoranda

submitted by counsel, the arguments of counsel, affidavits and
other evidence presented with the memoranda.

The court has also

reviewed its prior Memorandum Decision (issued August 11. 1988, and
Case No, MICROFILMED

ADD 0 0 10

modified April 12, 1989) granting defendants1 Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment on Claims One through Six and denying plaintiff's
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and the memoranda submitted by
the parties

in conjunction with

that decision.

Being

fully

advised, the Court issued a Memorandum Decision, dated March 27,
1991, granting defendants1 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
The Court now enters this Order and Judgment granting defendants1
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that defendants1

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Claims Seven through Twelve
is granted. On those claims there are no disputes of material fact
and defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

The

Court adopts and incorporates by reference its Memorandum Decision
dated March 27, 1991. This case has been bifurcated on stipulation
of the parties and Order of the Court.

The Court expressly

determines, pursuant to Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
that there is no just reason for delay, and, accordingly, this
Order and the Courtfs prior Order dated May 31, 1989, expressly
constitute final judgment for the defendants on Claims One through
Twelve.

Further proceedings on the remaining claims, which have

been bifurcated, are stayed, pending appeal and resolution of the
Court's decision granting summary judgment on Claims One through
Twelve.

Parties to bear their own costs and attorney's fees.
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Plaintiff is advised that he has thirty (30) days from the date of
entry of this Order to appeal.
DATED this XS

day of April, 1991.
BY THE COURT

Gordon J . Lov^Di^tTI^rtr-Court Judge

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Robert R. Wallace
Attorney for Plaintiff

35\clb\15362.001\order
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF BOX ELDER
STATE OF UTAH

LEO A. WALKER,

]

Plaintiff
vs.

]

BRIGHAM CITY, PETER C.
KNUDSON, BETH W. GURRISTER,
DAVID G. HACKING, DEE J.
HAMMON, ROBERT B. SHELTON, and
MARK A. WALKER, REDEVELOPMENT
AGENCY NO. 1 OF BRIGHAM CITY,
REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY NO. 2 OF
BRIGHAM CITY: MICHAEL T.
COSGROVE, and JOHN OR JANE
DOES I THROUGH X,

]
])
)
))
]
]
]
]
]
]

Defendants

MEMORANDUM DECISION
CASE NO. 870030069

]

THIS MATTER is before the Court upon the Defendant's Motion
for Summary Judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.
The Plaintiff bases his claim partially on the allegation
that the action by the city of charging rates, which he argues
are
unreasonably
high,
is
amoung
other
things
an
unconstitutional taking.
For reasons set forth in the
Defendant's Memorandum and Reply Memorandum this Court agrees
that the issue here does not necessarily rise to the level of
constitutional magnitude.
The city does not argue that the Plaintiff may challenge
the rate making process, or more specifically the rate levels,
and agrees that this Court has the power to review the rate
making process to determine if it is free from arbitrary and
capricious exercise of power and that rates are reasonable for

^^HOSWML(S9-76A

c3^
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the service provided.
The two approaches are directly related. The Court has the
power to review either the rates or the rate setting procedure
where the rates are so unreasonable as to be the result of
arbitrary and capricious action. Caution obviously has to be
exercised in order not to intrude in an unwarranted fashion on
the legislative function, nor to make the Court a rate making
body.
This Court observed at the hearing, that if the legislature
wanted to limit the municipality's power to charge rates in
excess of those necessary to cover the costs, etc., it could
readily have done so. The Legislature did provide that the
rates charged are to be sufficient to provide for payment of
the interest
and principle, to create funds, pay for
administration
and
operation,
maintenance,
depreciation
reserve, impropriety, etc. It neither specifically allowed or
precluded profit - over and above that necessary for the above
mentioned purposes.
It is apparent from the language that the Legislature
envisioned the municipality charging enough to provide the
service in order that the service be not dependent on taxes or
other revenues to support the same. What the statute however
does not say is that, "such rates shall only be sufficient to
provide such payments, etc.". Had it done so, the Plaintiff's
argument would be easier to approach.
Moreover,
both
parties
appear
to
agree
that
the
municipality may, though not specifically authorized by the
statute or prohibited therefrom, charge enough for a reasonable
profit to be realized. The statute neither mentions nor

Walker vs. Brigham City
#870030069
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defines
"reasonable
profit",
but
does
mention
rather
"reasonable rates", specifically, "reasonable rate for the
service rendered". The issue then before us on this Motion for
Summary Judgment is whether there are facts in dispute as to
the allegation that Brigham City officials acted arbitrarily or
capriciously in setting the rates for utility services and or
are the rates unreasonably high.
Defendant would separate the actual consideration of the
rates from the rate setting process. This Court is not so sure
that that can be done. If the rates are unreasonably high then
it may follow the process or acts of the Brigham City officials
would therefore have to be likewise unreasonable, arbitrary or
capricious. The task of the Court it seems then, is first to
define "reasonable rates" by finding the legal standards to
apply/ then examine the rates charged to determine their
reasonableness.
The
parties
introduced
affidavits
and
portions
of
transcripts of depositions stating that the rates > charged by
Brigham City are related to those charged by investor owned
utilities and utilities owned and operated by municipalities of
a similar size. Plaintiffs Affidavit states that, among other
things, the rates charged are higher than needed for payment
and maintenance as provided by the statute and that the excess
funds are transferred to a general fund used for other public
purposes.
Though the Defendants
argue that this is not the
appropriate forum in which to question the wisdom of the
legislative discretion on the part of the Brigham City council,
the Defendant does admit that if in fact the Brigham City
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council acted arbitrarily or unreasonably in establishing these
rates or if the rates are unreasonably high then review by this
review is proper.
No allegations are made or supported for the purpose of
this Motion that the city's procedure of establishing the rates
is improper, that it failed to comply with the statutory
provisions or municipal ordinance in establishing the rates
except that the rates are higher than needed to provide for the
cost of production as envisioned by the statute and that the
rates were established with the intent of producing a surplus
to be transferred to the general fund. The actual procedure
with which the city undertook to set the rates, other than
above stated, is not challenged. (There was some argument by
the Plaintiff that historically the city did not comply with
the statutory requirements, but since this action is for
injunctive relief that issue is not particularly material for
this Motion for Summary Judgment.)
The Defendant has argued that reasonableness is a matter of
fact and this Court stated earlier in a Memorandum Decision
issued on August 11, 1988, that facts are necessary to
determine whether the rates being charged are excessive or
unreasonable. For cited authorities the Plaintiff has argued
that
in
the
Ventura
case
(Hansen
vs. the
Citv of
San-Buenaventura, 729 P.2d 186 California 1986) involved only a
3% return on the rates wherein this case there is a 30% rate of
return. Defendant has cited Triangle Oil, Inc. vs. North Salt
Lake Corporation, 609 P.2d 1338 (1980) for the principle that
the Court should exercise its powers of review only if it is
shown that the exercise of municipal power is, "so wholly

Walker vs. Brigham City
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discordant to reason and justice that its actions must be
deemed capricious and arbitrary and thus in violation of the
complainant's rights"•
The problem lies in discussing rates of return as opposed
to rates for services rendered. The statute does not preclude
any certain rate of return or profit, what it does require is a
reasonable rate for the service rendered. The question then is
not one of percentage of profit; i.e., rate of return but rate
charged for the value of the service rendered. That is what
the Court suggested in the August 11, 1988, Memorandum
Decision, that fees may not be in excess of the value of the
service provided. The city is not precluded bv that statute
from obtaining a certain rate of return, even a high rate of
return or profit, but it is precluded from charging a rate not
reasonable for than the value of the service rendered. This is
likely so because the city is the only provider of that
service. If the city charged rates greatly in excess of the
value of the service rendered, and since it is the only
provider in Brigham City by state law, then that rate would be
unreasonable and violative of the statute.
Contrary then to the Plaintiff's argument it would appear
that the determination of the value of the service rendered
must take into comparison the rates charged for similar
services provided to other consumers. That would necessarily
require an analysis of the rates charged by other municipal
providers and by other non-municipal providers. The cost of
producing the power by each individual provider is not the
bench mark against which the rate charged is compared, but
rather it is the value of the product provided or service

Walker vs. Brigham City
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rendered.
Value is generally determined by what the consumer is
willing to pay. Economics dictate that the higher the rate
charged perhaps the less the consumer is willing to buy and the
lower the rate charged the more the consumer is willing to
buy. However, because the Plaintiff and other individuals in
his position are a "captive consumer" it seems to this Court
that the amount other consumers are paying here and elsewhere
is a better criteria for determining reasonableness than the
costs of production as the best analysis of the value of the
service rendered.
The term "reasonable", as used in the
statute should be defined by comparison. Stated another way
the city then is not restricted to a cost basis analysis to
determine its reasonable rates, but the reasonable rates are to
be determined by the value of the service rendered. The only
way to reasonably determine the value of that service rendered
is to compare like services and rates.
If the city were selling its power for substantially higher
rates than like services provided by other providers or if the
city were selling its power for rates considerably lower than
sufficient to provide for maintenance of the costs as required
by statute then the Plaintiff's argument would be well taken.
But the uncontested fact that the city is charging rates
reasonably comparable to those charged by other providers, even
though higher than they need to in order to cover costs, does
not demonstrate that the rates are unreasonably high or that
the city acted unreasonably in exercise of its legislative
power. If the city government wants to charge less than what
it is charging now, but still sufficient to cover the costs, it

Walker vs. Brigham City
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may do so under the statute but that is a legislative function
to be controlled by the City Council and is an area in which
the Court should not intervene. Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment is therefore granted. Counsel for the Defendant is
directed to prepare a formal Order in conformance herewith.

Gordon J. Low
District Court Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing MEMORANDUM DECISION, postage prepaid to the following:
Robert R. Wallace, Attorney at Law, 4 Triad Center STE 500, P.O. Box
2970, Salt Lake City, UT 84110, Jody K. Burnett and Craig L.
Barlow, Attorneys at Law, 10 Exchange Place, 11th Fir., P.O. box
45000, Salt Lake City, UT 841110, Merrill G. Hansen and James I.
Watts, Attorneys at Law, 1245 Brickyard Road Dr., STE 600, Salt Lake
City, UT 84106 and Ben Hadfield and Jeff R. Thorne, Attorneys at
Law, P.O. Box F, Brigham City, UT 84302.
DATED this 2nd day of April, 1991.
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JODY K BURNETT
CRAIG L. BARLOW
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendants
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000

IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF BOX ELDER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

LEO A. WALKER,
Plaintiff,
ORDER

vs,
BRIGHAM CITY CORPORATION,
PETER C. KNUDSON, BETH W.
GURRISTER, DAVID G. HACKING,
DEE J. HAMMON, ROBERT B.
SHELTON, and MARK A. WALKER,
REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY NO. 1
OF BRIGHAM CITY, REDEVELOPMENT
AGENCY NO. 2 OF BRIGHAM CITY,
MICHAEL T. COSGROVE, and
JOHN or JANE DOES I through
X,

Civil No. 870030069

Defendants.

On March 21, 19 89 the parties, through counsel appeared
before the Court for argument on several motions, including
plaintiff's and defendants' Motions for Partial Summary
Judgment.

The plaintiff was represented by Robert R. Wallace

and defendants were represented by Jeff Thorne, Merrill Hansen
and Craig L. Barlow.

M I C R Q F I..L M E C

The parties had submitted MemoranT-ra.eriri
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support of their motions opposing the motions. On
August 11, 1988 this Court issued a Memorandum Decision
on both Motions for Partial Summary Judgment.

The plaintiff

had not submitted a memorandum in response to the defendants1
motion at the time the Memorandum Decision was issued despite
the fact that counsel for defendants had agreed that the
plaintiff could have additional time to file a responsive
memorandum.

The Court allowed the plaintiff to submit a

reply memorandum and has now reviewed all of the memoranda
submitted as well as the Court's file of the entire matter
and considered the arguments of counsel.

Based on the Court's

review and analysis its Memorandum Decision of August 11, 1988
granting defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on
claims 1 through 6 of plaintiff's Amended Complaint remains
the Court's decision in this case.

The Court also grants the

defendants Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Leo Walker
submitted in support of plaintiff's Memorandum Opposing
defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.

The Court

finds there are no disputes of material issues of fact and the
defendants are entitled to summary judgment on claims 1 through
6 of the plaintiff's Amended Complaint.
hereby

- 0 -

Therefore, it is

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that defendants' Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment is granted, with prejudice and
plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is denied, parties
to bear their own costs.
DATED this

^ / J ^ ^ay of May, 1989.
FIRST DISTRICT COURT: '--

Judge Gordon J. Low

AS TO FORM:
Robert R. Wallace
Counsel for Plaintiff

IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF BOX ELDER
STATE OF UTAH

LEO A. WALKER
MEMORANDUM DECISION

Plaintiff
VS

Civil No. 870030069

BRIGHAM CITY UTAH
Defendant

On the 11th day of August, 1988f this Court issued a
Memorandum Decision on both parties Motion for Summary Judgment.
The Plaintiff however was not given an opportunity to submit
his reply memorandum to the Defendant's Motion.
This Court has now received that reply and also heard
argument on the matter.

After reviewing the entire matter, both

in pleadings and in argument, the Court's earlier decision
remains.

The Plaintiff has not shown that he has been deprived

of due process, procedural or substantive or that he is being
deprived of equal protection of the laws.
In support of this argument, an affidavit was filed to
which a Motion to Strike, as the affidavit applies to these
matters is granted.

The Memorandum Decision earlier issued in this

case is affirmed (except for those provisions wherein there are
-

^

obviously typographical errors.)
Counsel for the Defendant is directed to prepare a formal

a

order in conformance herewith.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
**********************

I hereby certify that on this 12th day of April 1989, I
mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum
Decision, postage prepaid too, Robert R. Wallace, Attorney for
the Plaintiff, 4 Triad Center, Suite 500, P. 0. Box 2970, Salt
Lake City, Utah

84110 and to Craig Barlow & Jody K. Burnett,

Attorney's for the Defendant, 10 Exchange Place #1100, Salt Lake
City, Utah

84145, and to Jeff Thorne, Attorney for the Defendant,

P. 0. Box "F", 98 North Main, Brigham City, Utah

84302 and to

Merrill G. Hansen, Attorney for the Defendant, 1245 Brickyard
Plaza, #600, Salt Lake City, Utah

84106.

f~l! -77^1"J )/ /"//i*-^
Christine Morrison
Deputy Court Clerk

IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF BOX ELDER COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

LEO WALKER
Plaintiff,
VS.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
FILE NO. 870030069

BRIGHAM CITY ET AL
Defendants.

In this matter Leo Walker has filed a motion for
Summary Judgment, seeking therein a Declaratory Judgment, that
the electrical utility fees charged by Brigham City,
Corporation to its customers are excessive and
unconstitutional and for an injunction enjoining Brigham City
Corporation from collection of excess fees for utility
services, an injunction preventing Brigham City from
collecting the ]dfurposed $2.00 per month additional fee for an
electrical service and for attorney fees;
The relationship between the action for Summary
Judgment and the specific causes of action in the complaint is
unclear. The Plaintiff alleges the grounds for the motion are
that the charges made by Brigham City for Utility Services are
excessive and constitute a taking of Plaintiff's property
without constitutional due process, therefore in violation of
both Federal and State Constitutions and the excessive charges
are violative of the Utah Code annotated. Section 55-3-3.
There appears to be no dispute that between the years
1983 and 1987, the Defendant, Brigham City collected funds in
charges for utility services and transferred certain of thos
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funds into the City's general fund. The funds collected were
in excess of the sums of moneys required to operate the
electrical services provided by the city. Further allegations
are that during 1988 the City will transfer $1,275,858.00 from
the Utility Funds to the General Fund, that those funds
represent monies in excess of expenses relating to the
providing of electrical utility services. In addition thereto
the City is proposing a $2.00 per month electrical hook-up fee
for all persons using utilities during 1988-89. Neither of
the cases cited under section 1 of the Plaintiff's brief are
directly on point but are argued to be applicable by inference
or by implication.
It appears to the Court that one focal point of this
issue is what is meant under Section 55-3-10 of the Utah Code
annotated where in the City is authorized to charge rates for
services provided but not in excess of those "reasonable for
service rendered". Plaintiff argues that because the City
charges more for its electrical service than it needed to meet
the expense of providing this the service, it is therefore in
excess of a "reasonable rate for the service rendered". No
evidence or facts are supplied relative to what is a
"reasonable rate for the service rendered". In other words
though the City may be charging more for the service than it
costs the City to provide the same, that may not be
dispositive of the question of whether the charge is in excess
of "reasonable rate for service rendered".
The Court is left unaware of the facts as to whether
the Plaintiff is receiving his moneys worth or if the rate is
"reasonable for the service" he is provided or even how and if
that could be calculated. But it seems overly simplistic to
conclude that since the City receives more than it expends
related to electrical service that therefore its rate is "in
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excess of a reasonable rate for the service rendered". It
seems to the Court that far more information and facts are
needed before Summary Judgment can be granted on that issue.
The Defendant further argues since that this is not a class
action, Plaintiff must therefore be able to show that the
service charges he pays individually are unreasonable. Again
those are further facts which are not supplied and are of
which the Court is unaware at this juncture. Whether the
Plaintiff's claim is cognizable under the Federal Statute
cited in the complaint cannot at this time be determined.
The Plaintiff's second point essentially is that the
charging by the City of excessive fees not reasonably related
to the services being provided is a taking of property in
violation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights. The threshold
problem in this section of the Plaintiff's argument is the
same as the first, that is this Court is without sufficient
facts to determine whether the fees being charged are
excessive fees, unreasonably related to the service provided.
The fees obviously are in excess of the cost of
providing the service but they may not be in excess of the
value of the service received. Further facts must be provided
the Court on that issue. The Court distinguishes the case of
Weber Basin Hombuilder Association vs. Roy City as there was
apparently no showing by Roy City, that it had experienced a
commensurate increase in the cost of running the building
department, therefore justifying the increase from $10.00 to
$112.00 in building permits.The builder was receiving no real
benefit from the issuance of the building permit and therefore
it was easily determined that the increase to $112.00 was not
reasonably related to the service provided. In this case
however the Plaintiff is apparently receiving electrical
service and the question is whether or not what he pays for it

2
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is "reasonably related to the service provided". The
defendant further argues in response to point 2, that the
exact nature of the property right which the Plaintiff
alleges that he is being denied must at the on-set be
determined and that the Plaintiff has failed to identify the
same.
Obviously if the Plaintiff refused to pay what he
considers to be an excessive rate, that the utility service
will be discontinuted, therefore depriving him of a property
right which can only be done so legally if in fact the charges
are not excessive; otherwise the termination may be illegal
and an unconstitutional taking. Before we get to that issue,
the question of excess charges and the questions of the
charges and their reasonableness and the relationship to the
service rendered must be determined.
The Plaintifffs request therefore under point 2, for
Summary Judgment is denied and the claim under point 3, for
Attorney Fees is premature and therefore also denied.
The Defendants have moved this Court to strike the
affidavit of the Plaintiff. Where the motions are denied,
there is no need to rule on motion to strike.
The Defendants have filed motion for Partial Summary
Judgment on several portions of the complaint.
With respect to all claims against individual
defendants, they relate entirely to legislative functions,
even setting the budget, determining rates and expenses
allocable to the operation of the electrical and sewer
facilities in State, are legislative in nature and are
protected by an unbrella of immunity.
The first six claims of the plaintiff's complaint are
Federal Civil Rights Claims. Remaining issues are brought
under State law with respect to claim 1, of the plaintiffs
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complaint, the same alleges that the City is involved in a
Civil Rights violation against defendant by taking property
without just compensation, violative of the fifth amendment of
the United States Consititution. This Court specifically
finds that that allegation does not state a Federal Civil
Rights claim. In the denial of the Plaintiff's Summary
Judgment, this Court pointed out that the Plaintiff has not
shown that the rates charged are unreasonable, as
reasonableness must be determined on more factors than just an
expense/rate basis. It further assumed that the action is
being brought under the Civil Rights Acts, section 1983 of the
Civil Rights Act. But even if the allegation were true, that
does not constitute a valid claim under that act. Rather the
nature of alleged protected property interest of which the
Plaintiff is being deprived is not articulated, though the
defendant argues that the Plaintiff's relationship to the City
is contractual and therefore it does not fall within the ambit
of Constitutional protection. The Court does not necessarily
agree that that is dispositive of the question as the services
are far more than a contractual relationship. The City is the
only agencey able to provide such services. However if
Plaintiff's complaint is based on the breach of the implied
contract, through excessive charges, that
constitute a
Federal Claim.
The Court fully agrees with the defendant however in
that in this case, the Court or should restrain itself from
interferring with the exercise with legislative functions of
the City, unless the City is out-side of its authority, its
actions capricious, arbitrary, and or in violation of
Plaintiff's Constitutional Rights.
With respect to claim two of the Plaintiff's complaint,
the Plaintiff has failed to show how it is he is being
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discriminated against and therefore being deprived of equal
protection of the laws guaranteed by the United States and the
Utah Constitution. Plaintiff here allege that the City has
been involved in a violation of Plaintiff's procedural and
substant^e^"in due process rights. In support of the same the
plaintiff has not shown that he has been deprived of other
remedys available.
The claim under 1983 Civil Right Act cannot be
substantiated by showing that the defendant has violated the
State Statutes or State Constitutional law. The Plaintiff has
argued that the Defendant has acted in violation of Utah Code
Annotated above cited, but liability under the 1983 Civil
Rights rests upon violations of the United States Constitution.
Plaintifffs claim 4, relative to denial of equal
protection, is unsupported by any claim of discrimination at
against a class to which the Plaintiff belongs. In fact no
class to which he belongs is identified. Whether the law
requires a showing of a purposeful discrimination or a
specific intent on the behalf of the defendant, at this point
is irrevelant. The Plaintiff has failed to show a denial, of
equal protection.
Under claim five and six of the Plaintifffs complaint,
the Court fails to see where the Plaintiff has pled a
violation of a constitutional law, or an application of the
Federal or Constitutional Standards. Further more it seems
clear the claims made in one through six may be articulated
and sought through other remedial processes i.e. adequate
State remedies to redress a property damage claim may exist.
It seem there can be no deprivation of due process of law
since the due process has not been accessed. Another avenue
aside from the seeking of a 1983 Civil Rights Claim have not
been
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exhausted but here the Plaintiff has failed to show a
deprivation of a Federal Constitutional protected Civil Right.
The reasons above stated the defendants motion for
Summary Judgment with respect from claims one through six and
all claims against individual defendants shall be dismissed
and the Summary Judgment granted.
Counsel for the Defendant is directed to prepare a
formal order.
Dated this ///&<
day of August, 1988.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that on the 12th day of August, 1988, I
mailed, postage oreoaid, a true and correct cony of the foregoing
Memoranudm Decision to Robert R. Wallace , 175 South West Temple,
#650, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 and Alan B. Asay, 5251 South Green
Street, Murray, Utah 84123, attorneys for plaintiff and to Allan L
Larson, 10 Exchange Place 11th Floor, P.O. Box 45000, Salt Lake City,
Utah 84084, to Ann Swensen, 10 Exchange Place, 4th Floor, P.O. Box
45000, Salt Lake City, Utah 84145, to Jody K. Burnett, 10 Exchange
Place 11th Floor, P.O. Box 45000, Salt Lake City, Utah 84145, to
Stanley K. Stoll, 10 Exchange Place 11th Floor, P.O. Box 45000,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145, to Merrill G. Hansen,1245 Brickyard Road,
#600, Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 and to James I. Watts, 1245 Brickyard
Road, #600, Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 attornevs for the defendants.

